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Trade Protectionism and Environmental

Regulations: The New Nontariff
Barriers*
C. Ford Runge**

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article reviews some economic and legal aspects of the growing
role of environmental, health, and safety regulations operating as disguised barriers to trade. While this has always been a recognized problem in trade policy, the issue has gained new force as environmental
policies move to the forefront of many national agendas. Because environmental standards have a growing national constituency, they are especially attractive candidates for disguised protectionism. International
distinctions in the tolerable level of environmental risks are created because the weight attached to environmental standards tends to vary with
the income levels of different countries. Incentives are created to move
restricted product and processes into areas of lax regulation, notably developing countries, while denying import access to countries that may
not subscribe to the regulatory policies of the developed countries. Without multilateral action, environmental standards become sources of trade
tension.
The article is organized as follows. First, the issue of environmental
*

This article is based in part on a chapter appearing in AGRICULTURE AND WATER QUALITY:
(John B. Braden and Stephen B. Lovejoy, eds.), Lynn Rienner,

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Boulder, Colorado, 1990, and in revised form in Environmental Risks and International Trade
Policy, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, March 1990 and with Richard Nolan in Trade in Disservice"
Environmental Regulation and Agricultural Trade, FOOD POLICY, February, 1990. Financial
support provided by Northwest Area Foundation, St. Paul, Minnesota.
** Director, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy; Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, and
Department of Forest Resources, University of Minnesota

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

11:47(1990)

regulation is discussed in an international context, with special emphasis
on food, health, and safety. Second, the problems created by national
income disparities and the different priorities of national governments are
noted. Third, a case study based on a recent United States - Canada
dispute over salmon and herring exports is analyzed. The article closes
by suggesting an agenda for both domestic and international policy reforms, focusing on a multi-tiered set of international standards that will
help distinguish legitimate health and environmental regulations from
disguised non-tariff barriers.
II.

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

On January 1, 1989, the European Community (EC) announced a
on
all beef imports from the United States containing hormones used
ban
to help increase cattle growth. Citing health risks, the EC action touched
off a cycle of retaliation worth hundreds of millions of dollars that has
affected the world trading system. This apparently isolated example of
health regulations acting as trade barriers is part of an emerging pattern
of environmental and health issues with major consequences for the
world economy. These consequences are especially important to trade
between developed and developing nations.
Other developments include discussions by the European Commission in September, 1989 of rules to further restrict imports of cattle or
dairy products produced with the aid of bovine somatotropin (BST), a
bovine growth hormone. In February of 1989, the Natural Resources
Defense Council released a report citing significant health risk from the
use of Alar, a chemical used to prevent blemishes on apples. United
States regulatory agencies may ultimately ban its use, and the EPA announced that it would increase its capacity to ban certain agricultural
chemicals. Senator Pete Wilson (R, Ca), the governor elect for California, introduced federal legislation in December, 1989 that would ban
companies from exporting pesticides that are illegal in the United States.
Responding to the political influence of the Western Growers Association, Wilson stated that "export of dangerous pesticides creates a competitive inequity between foreign and American farmers and growers."
In October, 1989, a dispute settlement panel formed under the United
States/Canada free trade agreement determined that Canadian restrictions on foreign salmon and herring fishing were an effective barrier to
trade.
These examples are part of an emerging pattern in which environmental and health risks are increasingly traded among nations along
with goods and services. These risks arise directly from the transfer of
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technology, and will increasingly affect international investment, trade,
and development. 1
This pattern of trade underscores the problem of formulating government policies in an interdependent world economy. While the United
States and other signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (hereinafter "GATT") pursue more open borders in the ongoing
Uruguay Round, safety and environmental regulation grows in importance for domestic electorates - especially in wealthy countries of the
North. Increasingly, different national regulatory priorities will pose
problems for trade harmonization, blurring the distinction between domestic and foreign economic policy. Without additional attempts to
come to terms with environmental issues through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, OECD, World Bank, and GATT, differences in national regulatory approaches will bedevil both the
environment and the trade system in the next decade and beyond.
The examples cited above demonstrate that environmental regulations are not purely domestic policy issues. As economist Ingo Walter of
New York University has written, "the fact of national sovereignty in
environmental policy, when coupled with its economic consequences,
leads directly to repercussions on international economic relations." 2
Indeed, there has been longstanding recognition of the possibility of
conflicts between national environmental policy and more liberal international trade. The GATT articles, adopted in 1947, explicitly recognize
the possibility that domestic health, safety, and environmental policies
might override general attempts to lower trade barriers. 3 GATT Article
XI headed "General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions", states in
paragraph (1)
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or
export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product
of the territory of any contracting party or on the exportation or
sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any
other contracting party.
1 Nolan, Hon. Richard and C. Ford Runge, Trade in Disservices: Environmental and Health
Damages in InternationalTrade, Staff Paper P89-8, February 1989. Department of Agricultural and
Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.
2 Walter, Ingo, InternationalEconomic Repercussionsof Environmental Policy: An Economist's
Perspective, in Rubin and Graham, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE (Rubin & Graham ed.) (Allanheld,
Osmun 1982).
3 JAcKsoN, J.H., WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (Bobbs-Merrill NY 1969).
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Yet Article XX, headed "General Exceptions", provides
.. nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting part of measures:
..(g)relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption; provided
that such measures:
• ..are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade...
A similar set of exceptions is applied to health-related measures
under Article XX(b). GATT law emphasizes that any restrictions posed
on foreign practices for environmental or health reasons must also reflect
a domestic commitment, so that the exceptions cannot be misused as a
disguised form of protection.
These attempts in the GATT articles to balance the objectives of
more open trade with national sovereignty over environmental and
health measures have not successfully defused the problem. Indeed,
although tariff barriers, especially in the manufacturing sector, have
fallen several-fold since 1947, nontariff barriers have become an increasingly seductive means of protection.4 Recognizing this problem, in 1971
a special commission (the Williams Commission) sought to identify key
areas of potential trade conflict, and to recommend policies to prevent
the spread of nontariff protectionism. In that year the Williams Commission recommended that "serious efforts be made to harmonize environmental quality standards to the greatest possible extent". But that goal
has been far easier to state than to achieve. Writing in the early 1980's,
Rubin and Graham noted that developed countries were moving along a
far faster track of environmental regulations than other parts of the
world. As they emphasized, a strong political constituency had emerged
in the developed countries for environmental standards. Less obvious
was the fact that this constituency could also be turned to the purpose of
protectionism. "In the United States, and perhaps elsewhere hard political battles to establish environmental standards have recently been
fought and won. Proponents of these standards will fight equally hard to
prevent their modification to accommodate an international consensus. '
At roughly the same time, the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
4 RUBIN AND GRAHAM, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE

5 Id.

(Allanheld Osmun NJ 1982).
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Negotiations promulgated a "Standards Code" that has tried (also
largely without success) to grapple with the balance between health,
safety, and environmental standards and trade liberalization. 6 This 1979
code supplemented the GATT rules that require "national treatment"
(no less favorable to importers than to domestic parties) and prohibit the
"nullification or impairment" of trade concessions through the back door
device of nontariff barriers.' The purpose of the Code was to prevent any
product, technical, health, safety, or environmental standard from creating "unnecessary obstacles to international trade."8
The main principles of the Code are reiterated in United States domestic trade legislation. However, this legislation clearly indicates congressional reluctance to surrender sovereignty over such wide-ranging
standards to the GATT or other multilateral bodies. In addition to the
usual caveats concerning why international standards may be inappropriate to the United States (e.g. national security), The Trade Agreements
Act of 19791 explicitly notes in section 402 that the United States may
elect nonconformance with international standards in order to assure
"the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life, or health,
or the environment."' 10
Despite an additional decade of discussions including substantial attention to both technical standards and nontariff barriers in the Uruguay
Round, scheduled to end in 1990, it is still unclear when and where such
standards constitute an unnecessary obstacle to international trade. If
anything, the temptation to use environmental and health standards to
deny access to home markets is stronger now than in the 1980's. As the
European Community moves toward its goal of market integration in
1992, it will have strong incentives to create common regulations for internal purposes, but to impose restrictions vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
A similar propensity may occur as a result of harmonization under the
United States/Canada free trade agreement. However, even if national
standards can be harmonized there is every reason to expect subnational
jurisdictions to utilize various health and environmental standards to
protect certain markets.
6 Code of Conduct for Preventing Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Doc. MTN/NTM/WI192/Rev. 5; See Supra note 4, at 162.
7 Supra note 3.
8 Supra note 5, at 8.
9 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2501-2581 (West 1990).
10 Supra note 5, at 9.
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The North/South Gap in Regulation

Underlying the development of these trade tensions are fundamental
differences in the views of developed and developing countries (the
"North" and "South") concerning the appropriate level and extent of
environmental regulation. Differences in the domestic policy response to
these problems are well represented in the food systems of the North and
South. Since so much recent attention has focused on food and agricultural chemical use in the North, and because the agricultural sector is of
key importance in almost all developing economies of the South, it provides a useful case in point.
In the developed countries of North America and Western Europe,
the "food problem" arises not from too little food and land in production, but generally too much. As predicted by Engels' Law, the incomes
of developed countries have increased, and the share of this income spent
on food has fallen in proportion to other goods and services. This characteristic makes food an "inferior good" in economics jargon. In contrast, environmental quality and health concerns have grown in
importance with increasing income levels. They are what economists call
"superior goods," in the sense that they play a larger role in the national
budget as national incomes increase."
In low-income developing countries, while the share of national resources devoted to food and agriculture remains large (creating substantial markets for yield-increasing products), environmental quality and
occupational health risks are widely perceived as concerns of the rich.
Even if these risks are acknowledged, the income levels of most developing countries do not permit a structure of environmental regulation comparable to that in the North. This two-tiered structure of international
environmental regulation, with stricter regulatory regimes in developed
countries paired with lax or non-existent regulations in developing countries, increases the North-South flow of environmental risks. A kind of
"environmental arbitrage" results, in which profits are gained by exploiting the differential in regulations. This environmental arbitrage results
from conscious policy choices that reveal differences in the value attached to environmental quality by rich and poor countries. As these
paths of institutional innovation increasingly diverge, so will the differential impact of environmental constraints on producers in the North and
competitors in the South such as Argentina and Brazil.1 2
11 Runge, Induced Agricultural Innovation and Environmental Quality: The Case of Groundwater Regulation, LAND EcoNoMics at 249-58 (1987).
12 Runge, Houck, and Halback, Implications of Environmental Regulationsfor Competitiveness
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The competitiveness implications of these trends are not lost on
Northern producers. They have been quick to see the trade relevance of
environmental and health standards. Growing consumer concerns with
the health and environmental impacts of agriculture create a natural (and
much larger) constituency for nontariff barriers to trade, justified in the
name of health and safety. As between countries in the North, obvious
differences in values also exist, although the regulatory gap is less
yawning.
An example of the problem created by this regulatory gap arises in
the agricultural fertilizer and chemical industry. Since World War II,
food systems in both the North and South have become increasingly dependent on chemicals and fertilizers in order to raise agricultural productivity. Chemical "inputs" have been responsible for dramatic increases
in yields, and have made food an important meeting point for environmental, health, and trade issues. Yet many of the chemical and fertilizer
inputs on which agriculture now depends have been found to have health
and environmental impacts, especially if poorly managed or inappropriately used. In response, the food systems of developed countries have
been constrained by regulations designed to protect environmental quality and human health.
In most developing countries, however, food production and agricultural development remain the primary focus of concern. Because agriculture is a major trade sector, incentives are created to export
restricted agricultural and industrial production methods from North to
South. In addition, when products produced by methods regulated in
the North are imported from the South where such regulation is lax or
nonexistent (e.g., Mexican or Chilean fruits and vegetables), competing
producers may demand protection. As a specific example, consider the
evolution of U.S. policies toward pesticides, herbicides and fungicides.
How does the regulatory climate, affecting sales of these chemicals, interact with trade flows in this sector?
U.S. sales of these products grew at an average of 6 percent per year
between 1965 and 1974, fluctuated throughout the 1970s, and fell along
with farm financial conditions and acreage cut-backs in the 1980s. 13
From the perspective of U.S. industry, softening domestic demand in the
1980s had stimulated a search for foreign marketing opportunities. By
1986, the U. S. pesticide industry exported 34 percent of its total sales
in Agricultural Trade, Chapter 4 in AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: DiscovERING THE CRITICAL LINKAGES (Boulder and London) (Sutton and Reinner ed. 1988).
13 See International Trade Commission, Synthetic Organic Chemicals, 1978-86; 1965-78 (USDA
1978); The PesticideReview (U.S. Bureau of the Census Report No.s F17210, Fr410, FT610).
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value ($1.4 billion) compared with 26 percent in 1965. Part of the incentive to increase foreign sales arose from the substantial fixed costs of
bringing new products to market in the face of internal research and development expenses and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
registration requirements. Research and development in the industry is a
major expenditure due to specialized personnel, manufacturing specifications, and tight government controls. Large quantities of chemicals must
now be screened to find those that target specific markets and conform to
environmental regulations.1 4
In 1986, for example, pesticide researchers screened 13,500 compounds for every one registered by the EPA, compared with 5,500 compounds screened per registration in 1967. The time lag between product
discovery and marketing likewise rose from an estimated 5 years in 1967
to 10 years in 1986. Anticipated amendments to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA) and the 1990 Farm Bill are all likely to effectively constrain
agricultural chemical uses.15
These are but several examples which may raise the fixed costs of
doing business domestically, creating incentives for firms producing fertilizers and chemicals to expand markets where regulatory oversight is
less constraining. These fixed costs create powerful motivation, once a
chemical is registered and in use, to build long-term markets. If domestic markets tighten due to market or regnlatory factors, foreign markets
are all the more crucial in spreading these fixed costs over sufficient sales
volume. Finally, this process is likely to make entry into the pesticide
industry by smaller firms more difficult, concentrating industry activity
in larger firms with international marketing strategies.
Studies examining the general impact of environmental regulations
on the location decisions of major industries have been relatively inconclusive, although there is a growing evidence that the regulatory gap between North and South will have long-term implications for both
environmental and trade policy. As Walter noted, ". . . environmental
factors may gradually take on greater importance in the decisions and
planning of multinational firms, so that the international locational effects on industry of differential environmental policies throughout the
14 Swanson and Dahl, The US. PesticideIndustry: Usage Trends andMarket Development, Staff
Paper P89-5, January 1989, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of
Minnesota.
15 Batie, Agriculture as the Problem: The Case of GroundwaterContamination, CHOICES (3rd
Quarter, 1988); Benbrook, The Environment and the 1990 Farm Bill, J. SOIL AND WATER CONSERV. (November-December 1988).

Trade Protectionism
11:47(1990)
decision system of international firms may take on somewhat greater significance in the years ahead."' 6 Of perhaps even more importance will be
the response of farmers and others in both developed and developing
countries for whom relocation is not an option. In the North, these producers will have an incentive to raise protectionist nontariff barriers in
the name of health, safety and the environment, while in the South, they
may be compelled to suffer higher risks in order to maintain competitive
advantage.
Increasing production and consumption of chemicals in the food industry over the last forty years have thus created a flow of trade that is
both beneficial and fraught with risks. Despite current criticism of their
use in agriculture, these products have been responsible for much of the
global increase in agricultural output, without which billions of people
would be both poorer and more hungry than they are today. In the postwar period, gains in food production throughout the developed and developing world have been powered by significantly increased applications
of these products. But this trend has been accompanied by growing concern over environmental impacts. The point is not to end the use of these
chemicals, but to use them responsibly and knowledgeably.' 7
To do so immediately raises the question of regulatory standards
affecting their use. Modem chemical inputs require substantially more
information to use safely and effectively, and such standards are complicated both to develop and to apply. Especially in the South, the inputs
themselves are aggressively marketed and subsidized, yet farm-level education (including the basic literacy necessary to read package instructions) is seldom given comparable attention. Yet the absence of such
standards exacts a high toll. Human poisoning in developing countries
due to overapplication of pesticides is common. For example, per capita
pesticide poisonings in the seven countries of Central America are 1,800
times higher than in the United States, according to Jeffrey Leonard of
the Conservation Foundation. 8 How are standards to be developed that
reflect the North's concerns with environmental quality, while attending
to the different needs and priorities of the South?
Given the tension separating North and South, and the lesser differences between countries in the North, it would appear that a single set of
16 Walter, InternationalEconomic Repercussions of Environmental Policy: An Economist's Perspective, in Seymour and Rubin, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE (Allaneld, Osmun, N.J. 1982).
17 Baanante, Bumb, & Thompson, The Benefits of FertilizerUse in Developing Countries, International Fertilizer Development Center, Muscle Shoals, Alabama (1989).
18 Leonard, Remedies are Available for Latin America's Environmental Ills, CONSERVATION
FOUNDATION LETTER, No. 2 (1989).
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standards is unlikely to be successful. The Subsidies Code adopted during the Tokyo Round is at least a necessary staring point, but some
mechanism must be found to accommodate differences in national priorities linked to levels of economic development and cultural factors.
B.

Determining When a Standard Is an "Unnecessary Obstacle to
Trade"

How might such standards be developed? Consider a 1989 case
heard by a panel convened under the U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement. 19 The case involved a panel established to hear testimony over
Canadian restrictions on exports of Pacific Coast unprocessed salmon
and herring. Such restrictions date to 1908, but were found illegal under
GATT in 1987 after the United States complained that they were unjustifiable restrictions on trade. In 1988, Canada accepted the GATT finding,
but stated that it would continue a "landing" requirement for foreign
boats which would allow inspection of their catch. The ostensible reason
for the requirement was an environmental one: to allow the fish harvest
to be counted and monitored so as to preserve the fishery from
overexploitation.
According to the United States, the requirement that its boats must
land in Canada constituted an export restriction, because of the extra
time and expense U.S. buyers must incur in landing and unloading, as
well as due to dockage fees and product deterioration. The Canadians
held that they were pursuing "conservation and management goals" for
five varieties of salmon (some of which had previously not been covered
by the landing requirement) as well as herring. Essentially, the Canadians sought to justify under Article XX of the GATT (the "General Exceptions" section noted above) what had otherwise been found GATTillegal, by appealing to an environmental claim under Article XX(g):
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
The U.S. argued that although the new herring and salmon regulations "are carefully worded to avoid the appearance of creating direct
export prohibitions or restrictions, their clear effect is to restrict exports".20 Moreover, the Canadian landing requirement was argued not
to be "primarily aimed" at the conservation of herring and salmon
stocks, which had been the interpretation given to Article XX(g) by the
1987 GATT ruling. Thus, the United States held that the Canadian
landing requirement was an environmental policy acting as a disguised
19 McRae, Canada'sLanding Requirementsfor Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring,(1989).
20 Id at 13.
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restriction on international trade. Canada argued that the landing requirement was "primarily aimed" at the conservation of the salmon and
herring fisheries.
In a significant decision, the Panel found that if the effect of such a
measure is to impose a "materially greater commercial burden on exports
than on domestic sales," it amounted to a restriction on trade, whether or
not its trade effects could be quantitatively demonstrated. The Panel
"was satisfied that the cost of complying with the landing requirement
would be more than an insignificant expense for those buyers who would
have otherwise shipped directly from the fishing ground to a landing site
in the United States."'" With regard to the Article XX(g) exception, the
Panel was conscious "of the need to allow governments appropriate latitude in implementing their conservation policies," and that the trade interests of one state should not be allowed to override the "legitimate
environmental concerns of another."2 "If the measure would have been
adopted for conservation reasons alone," the Panel found, "Article
XX(g) permits a government the freedom to employ it." However, balancing this is the "primarily aimed at" test, which determines whether
the measure is part of a genuine conservation or environmental policy, or
is in fact a disguised barrier to trade.
This line of reasoning led the Panel to two conclusions. First, "since
governments do not adopt conservation measures unless the benefits to
conservation are worth the costs," the magnitude of costs to the parties- foreign and domestic-who actually bear them must be examined." Second, "how genuine the conservation purpose of a measure
is, must be determined by whether the government would have been prepared to adopt that measure if its own nationals had to bear the actual
costs of the measure."23 In this case, the Panel was unconvinced that the
measure would have been imposed on all Canadian boats primarily for
conservation reasons. Specifically, the Panel found that Canada would
not have adopted such a measure "if it had required an equivalent
number of Canadian buyers to land and unload elsewhere than at their
intended destination."'2 4 Alternative methods of monitoring catch rates
were available which posed far fewer restrictions on trade.
Generalizing from this case, it seems possible to envision the development of criteria based on (a) estimated costs of health, safety and environmental regulations; (b) evidence on who bears these costs; and (c)
21 Id. at 25.

22 Id. at 29.
23 Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
24 Id. at 32.
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judgments of whether such measures would be imposed in the absence of
any trade effects. Such criteria can serve as a basis for the development
of standards determining which environmental and health measures constitute unnecessary obstacles to trade.
Consider a specific example arising from the 1989 United States decision to embargo Chilean fruit and vegetable imports after traces of cyanide were found in two grapes. Would the costs imposed on Chile by a
complete embargo have been imposed on domestic U.S. interests if two
California grapes had been adulterated? In estimating these costs, and
their trade effects, differences in national levels of living must also come
into play. Since Canadian and U.S. fishing interests are in the main a
homogeneous group, the problem does not arise. Where the measures
promulgated in one country loom much larger in relation to incomes in
another (e.g., Chile and the United States), an a priori argument for a
differentiated approach exists.
In view of differences in levels of economic development and national priorities, it is clear that standards cannot be wholly uniform. Jeffrey James, in The Economics of New Technology in Developing
Countries, 5 suggests that despite valid arguments for improved health
and environmental regulations in the South, "it does not follow from this
that countries of the Third World should adopt either the same number
or the same level of standards as developed countries." James suggests
what may be called intermediate standards, "in the same sense and for
the same basic reasons as that which underlies the widespread advocacy
of inter-mediate technology in the Third World." This does not imply a
"downgrading" of U.S. regulations, but an "upgrading" of developing
countries' norms, together with the recognition that the social costs of
regulation are relative to national income.
Under GATT law, these distinctions are recognized as "Special and
Differential Treatment" of lower income countries. While "S&D" often
creates serious long run distortions, the terms under which it is granted,
as James emphasizes, may actually reduce current regulatory differentials
by raising norms in the South, thus improving developing countries' environmental policies. While this may not satisfy all competing producers
in the North, it can contribute to reductions in overall trade tension
while improving environmental quality in the South.
25 JAMES, THE ECONOMICS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

James eds. 1982).

(Stewart and
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III.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD ACTIVIST MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES

The global consequences of failure to confront these complex
problems are increasingly clear, in both environmental and trade terms.
The Brundtland Commission Report, undertaken by the United Nations
and the World Commission on Environment and Development, has underscored the need for international action on a wide range of environmental issues.2 6 Despite such calls to action, little has yet been done to
move effectively to reduce environmental and health hazards at the international level, and to coordinate environmental and trade policy through
GATT, the World Bank, and other multilateral institutions.
Environmental risks traded across national borders require international policy responses. The World Bank has recently raised the profile
of environmental issues in project planning and appraisal. But many,
both inside and outside the Bank, are skeptical of the commitment. It is
vital that the United States government, as a principal financial supporter, emphasize the seriousness of the issues to Bank staff. Similarly,
United States activities in U.N. agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and U.N. Environmental Program (UNEP)
need to place environmental needs in developing countries far higher on
the agenda than in the past. By raising the level of environmental standards in the South, the gap in regulations with the North will be reduced,
easing trade tensions.
Unfortunately, despite recent attempts to deal with these issues in
forums such as GATT, the linkages from environmental regulation to
international trade have not been clearly recognized. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has worked to develop
comprehensive rules affecting food and agricultural health and safety,
called the "Codex Alimentarius."2 v A special technical working group at
the GATT Secretariat in Geneva is attempting to use this code as the
basis for harmonizing member countries' regulations. Unfortunately,
there are no agreed-upon standards except for a few items, and none are
regarded as binding in law. With the exception of the beleaguered
GATT working group, the issue has not been given priority by international institutions.
Beyond environmental considerations are shorter term problems of
trade distortion and market access. These distortions threaten more lib26 WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE

(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1987).
27 Food and Agriculture Organization, Introducing Codex Alimentarius, FAO/WHO FOOD
STANDARDS PROGRAM

(Rome 1987).
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eral international trade in ways that are damaging to both developed and
developing country interests. In spite of the vital importance of environmental quality, as well as more open trade, to developed country interests, those industries most clearly victimized by the changing structure of
environmental regulations in the North are likely either to resist environmental regulatory reform, or to demand import protection from countries that do not face similar constraints. In periods when rapid growth
in trade is one of the only avenues out of debt and deficits (for both the
North and the South), these distortions cannot be dismissed as
unimportant.
Given the complexity of formulating international approaches to environmental and trade policies, it is understandable that some have argued for loosening the environmental regulatory constraints affecting
industry in order to allow it to compete more effectively in global markets. However, this appears to be inconsistent with the growing importance attached to the environment and health in the political processes of
all countries. Yet tight regulatory constraints in developed economies do
have cost and competitiveness implications. The perception that foreign
competition does not face similar constraints breeds animosity and protectionism. Both at home and internationally, environmental standards
must therefore be strengthened.
The key is to recognize the inherently international character of environmental quality and health-issues which are similar in nature to
human rights. Only the force of international standards defining the duties of nations, corporations and individuals, can hope to resolve these
difficult issues. This does not, as I have emphasized, suggest that these
standards cannot be sensitive to levels of development.
To begin this process, the United States must take the lead in urging
existing multilateral institutions to coordinate their efforts. Some of this
coordination is underway. The GATT, IMF and World Bank, for example, have agreed to work more closely on issues of trade, aid and development. The use of environmental and health regulations as trade barriers
would provide an especially appropriate focal point for these efforts.
In addition to the development of carefully reasoned legal arguments determining when environmental and health standards are in fact
trade barriers, an international accord on environmental and health regulations would be appropriate. Similar in nature to the 1988 Montreal
Protocol agreed to by 40 nations to reduce emissions shown harmful to
the ozone layer, its purpose would be primarily invocational-to call for
the rights, duties and liabilities that define national regulations on environment and health-which can then be brought more nearly into ac-
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cord. In absence of such an agreement, groups within nations will
continue to advocate the use of regulations as disguised protectionism, or
loosening standards of environmental quality in the name of greater
competitiveness.

